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This article examines how the Alliance’s partnership policy has changed in Central Asia
and South Caucasus since the 1990s and aims to clarify to what extent NATO’s new
partnership policy can affect its relations with these countries. NATO–Russian relations
and the Afghanistan operation are evaluated as the main drivers of this process. The target
date of the withdrawal of the ISAF combat mission in December 2014, set at the Lisbon
Summit 2010, as well as the shifting of the focus of long-term US foreign policy to the Asia-
Paciﬁc region and the US aim of balancing China’s inﬂuence in this region increase the
necessity for the Alliance to redeﬁne its future policy towards Central Asia and South
Caucasus. The article claims these developments have caused the need to treat Russia more
as a partner than a potential competitor in constituting the policy towards Central Asia and
South Caucasus. Furthermore the article claims there is no possibility for new Alliance
expansion in this part of the world in the short to medium term.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction democratizing Europe. Partnership for Peace (PfP), which isNATO’s partnership policy has been one of the main
components of the Alliance’s response to the post-ColdWar
era, as well as a limited bond with the countries in Central
Asia and South Caucasus, both strategically important re-
gions in Eurasia. Partnership policy initially constituted an




sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haan important component of this policy, was considered as
an initiative on the way to NATO membership particularly
in Eastern and Central Europe. However it hasn’t had that
kind of inﬂuence in Central Asia and South Caucasus. This
fact partly clariﬁes why concrete cooperation remains
limited, although all ﬁve Central Asian Republics
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) and three South Caucasus countries (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia) take part in PfP. Because of the low
proﬁle of this policy in this part of the world, it is clear that
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission
in Afghanistan largely deﬁnes NATO relations with these
countries instead. Therefore the transfer of full security
responsibility from the ISAF to the Afghan National Security
Forces by the end of 2014 increases the necessity for the
Alliance to deﬁne its future policy towards Central Asia and
South Caucasus.
Adopted at the Lisbon Summit, NATO’s New Strategic
Concept emphasizes the necessity of maintainingnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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borders so as to ensure the security of NATO members, as
well as identiﬁes “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s
three essential core tasks. Partnership falls under this task.
After the Lisbon decisions, allied foreign ministers
endorsed a new partnership policy at their meeting in
Berlin on 15th April 2011. As such NATO’s partnership
policy has become one of the most important tasks of the
Alliance, at least in terms of the ofﬁcial discourse. Allies also
restated their goal of achieving cooperative security
through partnership during NATO’s Chicago Summit inMay
in 2012. Given this increasing emphasis on partnership, a
question arises as to its for what the partnership with the
countries in Central Asia and South Caucasus will be.
This article examines the evolving place of the NATO in
Central Asia and South Caucasus, giving an overview of the
partnership activities of the countries in the region. The
article aims to clarify how the Alliance’s partnership policy
has changed in this region since the 1990s as well as how
NATO’s new partnership policy will affect the relations
with these countries. The US interests and NATO–Russian
relations are evaluated as the main drivers of this process.
The shifting the focus of long-term US foreign policy to the
Asia-Paciﬁc region and the US aim of balancing China’s
inﬂuence has caused the need to treat Russia more as a
partner than a potential competitor in constituting the
policy towards Central Asia and South Caucasus. Given
these developments the article also claims there is no
possibility for new Alliance expansion in this part of the
world in the short to medium term.2 For more information about the problems regarding Afghanistan
operation among the allies, see. Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of2. NATO’s presence in Central Asia and South Caucasus
There are several factors which make Central Asia and
South Caucasus vital regions on the stage of world politics.
Firstly, this part of the world is a powerhouse of energy
resources, such as oil and natural gas. Secondly, the
geopolitical location of these areas hosts the “New Silk
Road”, an important trade route between China and Europe
and sits on the doorstep of China and Russia. Thirdly,
Afghanistan can also be regarded as a source of possible
threats to neighbouring countries and other countries of
the world because of its illegal drug production and traf-
ﬁcking, and terrorism.1 All these and other factors have
rendered the region important for the geopolitical interests
of the major and regional powers and international orga-
nizations and institutions. We can say easily that these
factors are exactly the same as and valid for NATO.
In the post-Cold War era, NATO’s policy towards Central
Asia and South Caucasus can be examined in three periods.
The ﬁrst period is between 1991 and 2001, the second is
between 2001 and 2010 and the third begins after the
adoption of NATO’s New Strategic Concept in 2010. The
Afghanistan operation is the main determinant in the
forming of these periods. With the beginning of the
Afghanistan operation, NATO increased its political and1 Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Internal and External Dynamics of Regional
Cooperation in Central Asia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol.1, No.1, 2010,
p. 96.military presence in the region. NATO’s involvement can be
explained through its willingness to prevent any likely
threat emanating from the region and to keep the region’s
supply routes to Afghanistan open.
In 2003, NATO formally took over command of the ISAF
in Afghanistan. Although NATO’s ISAF mission is not the
ﬁrst time the allies have debated the responsibilities they
have to each other beyond the territorial defence of their
own territories, this mission displayed very openly dis-
agreements amongst allies over this issue. Furthermore,
the ISAF initially operated in the relative safety of the
capital and its environs, but then the force steadily
expanded its responsibility and reached throughout
Afghanistan, including into the dangerous southern part of
the country. This development caused a burden sharing
problem amongst allies.2 The Afghanistan operation
exposed the lack of consensus on the description of com-
mon threat perception among Allies. Therefore these dis-
agreements increased the signiﬁcance of the partners’
contribution to the ISAF mission. Particularly, the contri-
bution from the partner countries in Central Asia and South
Caucasus has been enormously important due to their
geographical locations. The geography of Afghanistan has
prompted NATO to devote greater attention to these
countries, all of which have provided various forms of
assistance that are critical to NATO’s ability to operate in
Afghanistan: military bases, transit routes, and cooperation
on border security. Ties established with these countries
through the partnership policy facilitated NATO’s insertion
and presence in the region.
There are several reasons for why the third period starts
with the New Strategic Concept which is the third and the
last strategic concept that had been adopted since the end
of the Cold War. The New Strategic Concept was published
in a period when the effects of 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis
were clearly felt in the budgets of NATO countries and
when the US deﬁned its strategic priorities in Asia Paciﬁc
Region. In this new period starting after 2010, NATO
decided to pull out from Afghanistan and to renew part-
nership policy which deﬁnes the structure of the relations
of the Alliance with the countries in the region. These de-
velopments are elements which will shape NATO’s policy
for this region.
While forming NATO’s policies for this region, the
importance of the need to provide political and logistical
support to the ISAF and the need to maintain the balance in
NATO–Russia relations was recognized. During these pe-
riods NATO’s partnership policy and its tools have played a
facilitating role in ensuring ties between NATO and the
countries in the region. Before detailing NATO’s presence in
Central Asia and South Caucasus, there are a few general
points that can be made regarding the relations between
NATO and Russia. The most important reason for theNATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan”, Hakan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre
(eds.), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddaﬁ,
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 143–147; Mark Webber, “NATO: The
United States, Transformation and The War in Afghanistan”, The British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 11, No.1, 2009, pp. 49–50.
5 North Atlantic Council, “Statement”, 19 August 2008, http://www.
nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-108e.html (Accessed on 20.07.2013).
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lations between NATO and Russia have constantly under-
gone remarkable changes since the ColdWar ended. One of
the most important elements which determines the degree
of NATO’s effectiveness in the region is the relations NATO
has established with Russia. We can say that this situation
will carry on in this way.
3. NATO–Russia relations
NATO enlargement and its relations with Russia are
inextricably linked to each other. Prior to the decision of the
ﬁrst expansion of NATO’s post-ColdWar period in 1996, the
US Secretary of Defence William Perry stated that they
must create a new circle of security withinwhich European
nations may ﬁnd security and stability and Russia is inside
it not excluded from it.3 In fact, from that date NATO–Russia
relations have been exactly in the way as described by
William Perry. Through institutional arrangements such as
Russia’s membership in the PfP, the signing of the Founding
Act and the creating the NATO–Russia Council, Moscowwas
connected with the process of NATO enlargement but it has
not become amember of NATO. The most important reason
of this is that the United States does not want to see Russia
in the Alliance or against the Alliance.
In this context Russia joined PfP in 1994 to build up an
individual relationship with NATO, offering practical bilat-
eral cooperation on a wide range of issues. Russia was
involved in NATO’s peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and
in Kosovo. However, PfP does not have the same signiﬁ-
cance for Russia as it does for Central and Eastern European
countries, which had used the program to reconﬁgure their
armed forces in line with NATO standards. Signed on 27
May 1997, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooper-
ation and Security is a document that formalized ofﬁcially a
basis of the relationship between NATO–Russia Federation.
Evaluating the legal characteristics of this document, this
document is accepted as a legally non-binding act which
does not bring any legal obligation to the parties.4 However,
it should not be interpreted as a simple declaration.
Through this document both sides have ofﬁcially declared
that cold war hostility between NATO and Russia has been
replaced by cooperation and a mutual commitment to
peaceful relations in Europe. And this document symbol-
ized the relationship and its progression towards
institutionalization.
The NATO–Russia Council (NRC) established on May 28
2002, has also played a critical role in supporting the
relationship. The structure which was formed through the
Founding Act and NRC not only forms the basis of mutual
relations between Russia and NATO, but also is seen as
politically compatible with the interests of both parties.
However, there is the danger that these documents become3 US Department of Defense, “NATO and a “Super” Partners in Europe”
prepared Remarks of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, 24 September
1996, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid¼927
(Accessed on 20.07.2013).
4 Rein Müllerson, “NATO Enlargement and the NATO-Russian Founding
Act: The Interplay of Law and Politics”, The International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, Vol.47, No.1, Jan. 1998, pp.197.mere declarations in case the international conjuncture
changes or the relations among the parties deteriorate.
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and Russia’s intervention in
Georgia can be shown as examples. Although Russia was
invited to the Washington Summit which took place after
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in April 1999, Russia refused
to participate in the summit. As a result of NATO’s inter-
vention in Kosovo, Russian Federation suspended its
participation in the Founding Act and PfP, withdrew its
military mission from Brussels, terminated talks on the
establishment of NATO’s military mission in Moscow, and
ordered the NATO information representative in Russia to
leave the country. Thus the Founding Act lost its function-
ality until the establishment of NRC in 2002 which recon-
structed the relations.
After 2003 Moscow’s foreign policy became more in-
dependent and assertive and relations with NATO became
stretched again. This trend eventually culminated in the
Georgia Crisis of August 2008. On 19 August 2008 NATO’s
foreign ministers declared that the implications of Russia’s
actions for the NATO–Russia relationship were that NATO
could not continue doing “business as usual”, and military
and political cooperation in NRC was suspended.5 Its
meeting on 27 August, The North Atlantic Council con-
demned Russia for recognizing the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states.6 How-
ever, at their meeting on 3 December 2008, the NATO
foreign ministers mandated the Secretary General decision
to re-engage with Russia at the political level. At the same
time they refrained from granting the Membership Action
Plan (MAP)7 status to Georgia and Ukraine. It is clear that
NATO was unprepared for that kind of Russian military
move, and looked the other way and had no real response
to this. Although there was a political commitment to
eventual membership regarding these two countries given
at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO’s intention
regarding the membership of these two countries has just
remained on paper. I can say that it is highly unlikely that
NATO will offer to either country a MAP in the foreseeable
future. It seems clear that NATO states had not thought
much about the consequences of extending the Article 5
guarantee to Georgia as part of planned membership.8
There is still no indication that NATO prefers membership
with these states, which would be too risky given that the
importance of Russia’s partnership is increasing for US
foreign policy.
The NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in April 2009
invoked the formal revival of NRC activities at all levels.
Relations were again strained in May 2009 when NATO6 North Atlantic Council, “Statement”, 27 August 2008, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofﬁcial_texts_29950.htm, (Accessed on
20.07.2013).
7 The program NATO has used since 1999 to evaluate and provide
guidance to prospective member states regarding their progress towards
meeting NATO’s membership expectations.
8 Jane Haaland Matlary, “Partnerships to the East and South: A ‘Win-
Win’ Policy”, Hakan Edström et al. (eds.) NATO: The Power of Partnerships,
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2011, p. 64.
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and a NATO PfP exercise was conducted in Georgia from 6
May until 1 June 2009. In spite of these series of confron-
tations in the New Strategic Concept and Summit Decla-
ration, adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders
reiterated the importance of NATO–Russia dialogue and
partnership and emphasized the objective of cooperation
towards a true strategic partnership. “The Joint Review of
21st Century Common Security Challenges” endorsed at
the NRC Lisbon Summit serves as a roadmap for diversi-
fying and deepening the cooperation. This step can be
interpreted as both parties having realized that they have
common security interests, such as ISAF mission (transit of
NATO freight through the Russian territory), counter-
terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, crisis management,
and counter-narcotics.
We can say that during the Lisbon Summit, NATO
wanted to see Russia on its side not on the opposite side in
case of new threats. The membership of Ukraine and
Georgia to the Alliance was postponed in that context by
ensuring that relations were not harmed. Indeed Russia can
be shown to be a “loyal opposition”, challenging NATO
expansion, but prone to dialogue with NATO. Looking
generally at the historical development of NATO–Russia
relations, we see that the relations change depending on
the international conjuncture. In this context, we can say
that times of confrontation and reconciliation between
NATO and Russia will continue in the future. To summarize,
the course of these relations in medium and long term will
continue to affect expansion process of NATO and its policy
for Central Asia and Caucasus depending on the power
shifts in international conjuncture.
Georgia and Ukraine have been profoundly important to
NATO, both in terms of enlargement policy and as a type of
litmus test of Russian intentions regarding the enlargement
policy. As Matlary mentioned, the cost–beneﬁt calculus is
such that NATO’s security gain from a larger geo-political
‘footprint’ on Russia’s border is less than the obligation
incurred by Article 5.9 It is clear that Russianmilitary action
in Georgia formed borders with NATO. Although the
wording on potential Georgian membership is retained in
ofﬁcial documents, it is really difﬁcult to say that there is a
powerful political will to continue with this process on the
part of the NATO today.11 PfP was employed to prepare the twelve nations incorporated as full4. NATO’s partnership policy in the region
NATO’s partnerships have experienced a truly historical
development since the beginning of 1990’s. As Moore
clearly expressed, partnership initially constituted an
essentially political means of integrating and democra-
tizing Europe.10 Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks, NATO has focused more on addressing global threats
which would likely stem from areas beyond the North9 Matlary, “Partnerships to the East and South”, p.68.
10 Rebecca R. Moore, “Partnership Goes Global: The Role of Nonmember,
Non-European Union States in the Evolution of NATO”. Gülnur Aybet and
Rebecca Moore (eds.), NATO in Search of a Vision, Washington: George-
town University Press, 2010, 232–233.Atlantic area. Due to this reason NATO expected all partners
to contribute to NATO’s military operations especially its
Afghanistan operation. This expectation has also been the
main determinant of the cooperation between NATO and
its partners in Central Asia and South Caucasus.
NATO’s ﬁrst partnership program, PfP, launched in 1994,
mainly paved the way for practical co-operation between
NATO and the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well
as those of the former Soviet Republics in the Baltics, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia. All ﬁve Central Asian Republics
and the states in South Caucasus have beenmembers of PfP
since 1994, with the exception of Tajikistan, who joined
only in 2002. In the enlargement process, PfP would serve
as an important instrument to foster security reform and
prepare the partner countries for accession to the Alliance.
In this respect it can be expressed that this program has
reached one of the important goals since twelve of the PfP
countries are NATO members today.11 However, for the
Central Asians and the Caucasians, the situation is totally
different. We can easily say that except Georgia, other
countries have not been willing to become members of
NATO and many of these states are still strongly oriented
towards Russia. The fact that these countries haven’t ex-
pected or demanded to become members of NATO has
limited the inﬂuence of NATO on the countries of the re-
gion. However the Afghanistan operation signiﬁcantly
increased the importance of the cooperation with these
countries for NATO. At the same time this need for coop-
eration and the lack of willingness of the countries to
become members of NATO have also diminished the Alli-
ance’s insistence on its normative agenda which it imple-
mented in the process of granting membership to the
Eastern and Central European countries.4.1. The contribution of the NATO partners in Central Asia and
South Caucasus to Afghanistan operation
To reiterate an important point, the geography of
Afghanistan has prompted NATO to devote greater atten-
tion to the countries in Central Asia and South Caucasus, all
of which have provided various forms of assistance that are
critical to NATO’s ability to operate in Afghanistan,
including military bases, transit routes, and cooperation on
border security. Ties established with these countries
through the partnership policy facilitated NATO’s presence
in the region. In this context NATO created a wide range of
practical mechanisms and activities to promote coopera-
tion with the countries in the region, including the Indivi-
ual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), the
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) and Planning
and Review Process (PARP). IPCP offers a wide range of
partnership activities including defence reform, civil–members between 1999 and 2009: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia. Following states are still members of PfP: Armenia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia Federation,
Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
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military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency plan-
ning and disaster-preparedness, as well as cooperation on
science and environmental issues. IPAPs and PARP aremore
complex programmes, which require a higher level of
cooperationwith NATO, but allow access to awider range of
partnership activities.12
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks caused the US
to focus intensely on tackling the global threats with “war
on terror” and “preemptive war” discourses. Ideas adopted
especially by the US such as “the perception of threat to
NATO must undergo a change of perspective” and “threats
coming outside the Transatlantic region must be prevented
before they are turned into attacks” were also reﬂected in
NATO’s partnership policy. As mentioned above, the role of
NATO’s partnerships also shifted according to the new
needs. The existing partnership programs (PfP and Medi-
terranean Dialogue (MD)) were supported by the mecha-
nisms to improve interoperability in NATO-led operations,
and a new partnership program (Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI)) was prepared for regions fromwhich threats
may emerge. Some of the mechanisms were IPAP, Partner-
ship Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T), and Partnership
Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB).
At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO launched the IPAP to
deepen the cooperation between NATO and PfP countries.
IPAP is an inclusive document, envisaging conducting re-
forms in a wide variety of areas, such as defence, security,
science, andcivil emergencyplanning and requiring joint and
highly coordinated efforts of the governments of the partner
countries to implement the reforms efﬁciently. Partners who
expressed a desire for closer cooperation with NATO, but
were not assumed ready for participation in the MAP would
be eligible for an IPAP.With regard to Eurasia, IPAPwas really
well receivedamongthepartners.Georgia (2004), Azerbaijan
and Armenia (2005), and Kazakhstan (2006) were the
countries to approve their IPAPs.13 Most countries consider
that the programcan help them reform their defence sectors.
One of the mechanisms in question is PAP-T which was
also adopted in 2002 Prague Summit. The plan is a frame-
work through which Allies and Partner countries work to
improve cooperation in the ﬁght against terrorism, in a
variety of areas, including political consultations and in-
formation sharing, civil-emergency planning, force plan-
ning, air defence and airspacemanagement, border control,
arms control, non-proliferation, and training exercises
related to terrorism. In terms of state-building and the
regionalization of Central Asia, this plan is NATO’s way of
focussing on defence and security sector reform which are
especially relevant.14 One of NATO’s key tools in this regard12 See, NATO, “Partnership Tools”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_80925.htm?, (Accessed on 20.07.2013).
13 Developed on a two-year basis, these plans include a wide range of
objectives and targets for reforms on political issues as well as security
and defence issues. See, NATO, “Individual Partnership Action Plan”,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49290.htm, (Accessed on
20.07.2013).
14 Simon J. Smith and Emilian Kavalski, “NATO’s Partnership with Cen-
tral Asia”, The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors,
Emilian Kavalski (ed.), Singapore: World Scientiﬁc Publishing, 2010, p.38.is the PARP. PARP aims to provide a structured basis for
identifying partner forces and capabilities that could be
available to the Alliance for multinational training, exer-
cises and operations. Partners whose cooperation with
NATO is more advanced participate in this mechanism in
which some of their security forces also undergo defence
review procedures similar to those of NATO Allies them-
selves, in order to prepare them to participate in interna-
tional peacekeeping operations. Today, with the exception
of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, other Central Asian Re-
publics and the states in South Caucasus participate in the
PARP process.
The other mechanism is the PAP-DIB, launched at
Istanbul in 2004. With the rising of NATO’s involvement in
Afghanistan, the importance of the Caucasus and Central
Asia unsurprisingly grew and this plan targeted speciﬁcally
these regions. Both plans aimed to enhance political dia-
logue and practical cooperationwith partners on a range of
international and domestic issues, including terrorism,
democratization, and partner participation in NATO-led
operations. At the Istanbul Summit allied leaders also
decided to appoint a Special Representative for the Region
and to send a Liaison Ofﬁcer to the Region.
As for the contribution of the countries in Central Asia to
the Afghanistan operation, we can say that although none
of the Central Asian states has contributed troops to ISAF,
all have in varying degrees contributed to NATO’s need to
secure supply routes for the ISAF mission. Apart from the
American base in Manas/Kyrgyzstan, NATO member states
have three other military bases in the region geared to
supplying operations in Afghanistan: Germany in Termez/
Uzbekistan, France in Dusanbe/Tajikistan and the US at
Kuliab/Tajikistan. NATO’s agency in Central Asia aims to
keep the lines of communication open with the local gov-
ernments by involving them as much as possible in activ-
ities such as common planning, joint exercises, and
information exchanges. NATO offers educational facilities,
with some Central Asian ofﬁcers trained at the NATO De-
fense College, the NATO School, and PfP Training and Ed-
ucation Centers (PTCs).15
Looking at partners in Central Asia, we can easily say
that Kazakhstan is the most advanced state of Central Asia
in terms of cooperation with NATO. Kazakhstan is the only
Central Asian country to have agreed to an IPAP with the
Alliance, in early 2006 and, as a member of NATO’s PARP,
has a wide array of partnership projects. It takes part in an
Action Plan against Terrorism, which provides for the ex-
change of informationwith NATO members. It has got used
to cooperating periodically with the Alliance and usually
holds NATO activities such as the annual military exercise.
One of the PTCs located in Kazakhstan. Astana has also
created a peacekeeping force called KAZBRIG (Kazakh
Brigade) that collaborates with NATO under a UN mandate.
Notably, Kazakhstan volunteered to host the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum in June 2009.15 There are currently 24 PTCs recognized by NATO. For more infor-
mation see, Naval Postgraduate School, “PfP Training and Education
Center”, http://www.nps.edu/About/USPTC/PfP/PfPCenters.html,
(Accesssed on 20.07.2013).
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Afghanistan, energy security and Central Asian security,
had been held outside Europe.16 The third phase of the IPAP
was approved in August 2012 and reportedly involves
continued training for the peacekeeping battalion KAZBAT
(Kazakh battalion) and the KAZBRIG including at the PfP
Training Center at the Military Institute of the Army in
Almaty. However, this cooperation does not prevent
Kazakhstan from being an ally of Moscow and Beijing, or
from showing its support for most of the Russian proposals
for strengthened integration. Indeed, this fact is valid for all
partners in Central Asia. At this point it should be expressed
that Kazakhstan has been very capable of extracting exactly
what it wants from all the major actors such as Russia,
China and the US in the region, while at the same time not
upsetting any of them in a way that would risk ongoing
relations.17
The other states of the region have less cooperationwith
NATO. Uzbekistan sharply reduced its participation in PfP
after NATO raised concerns that Uzbek security forces had
used excessive and disproportionate force in Andijan
(however, it continued to permit Germany to use a base
near Termez). After President Karimov had attended the
NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, the Government of
Uzbekistan and NATO partly resumed their cooperation.
The US and NATO have been permitted to use the Navoi
airport (located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-
central Uzbekistan) for transporting nonlethal supplies to
Afghanistan.18 Yet it is obvious that the cooperation be-
tween NATO and Uzbekistan still remains very limited.
Since PfP accession, Kyrgyzstan has participated in a
number of PfP exercises, with a special focus on command
and control, civil-emergency planning and civil–military
cooperation. Kyrgyzstan joined the PARP in 2007. Bishkek
has set aside units for PfP operations, which have been
especially active in counter terrorism through the PAP-T.
Kyrgyzstan has hosted NATO at the Manas airbase (called
the Manas Transit Center since 2009) which became
operational in December 2001 and serves as the “premier
air mobility hub” for operations in Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan joined the IPCP, within this programme,
Turkmenistan chose not to participate in military activities,
in line with its position of “neutrality”. Although Turkme-
nistan’s commitment to neutrality limits deeper coopera-
tion, there has been some cooperation in the ﬁelds of civil
emergency planning, scientiﬁc, and environmental affairs.
However, its long border with Afghanistan has given
Turkmenistan an incentive to work with the Alliance on
border security issues. The other country is Tajikistan for
which border security is of primary concern. Tajikistan is
the last Central Asian state to become a member of PfP in
2002. In 2004 a transit agreement to support the opera-
tions of NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan was signed. In this16 Rebecca Moore, NATO’s Partners in Afghanistan: Impact and Purpose,
UNISCI Discussion Papers, No:22 (January/Enero 2010) p.100.
17 Roger N. McDermott, “Kazakhstan’s Partnership with NATO:
Strengths, Limits and Prognosis”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly,
Volume 5, No. 1, 2007, p.19.
18 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for
U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress No 7-5700, 2013, p. 54.regard the permission to use their railways and roads was
given. Tajikistan has shown growing interest in recent years
in slowly but steadily enhancing its cooperation with
NATO.19 At a length of roughly 1300 km, the border be-
tween Tajikistan and Afghanistan has long been difﬁcult to
control. Both countries are extremely mountainous, and
the rugged, porous border is hard to patrol extensively,
particularly given the limited security resources available
to Kabul and Dushanbe. Therefore, Tajikistan’s cooperation
with NATO focuses on border security.
As for partners in South Caucasus, all three states are
membersof thePfPandPARP, andall haveagreed tocontribute
or are already contributing troops to the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. But the integration of each country into Euro-
Atlantic practices has been more or less limited to joint mili-
tary exercises and support for security-sector programs.
Azerbaijan, which contributed forces to KFOR from 1999
to 2008 has supported the ISAFmission from the beginning.
Azerbaijan also maintains an IPAP with NATO and partici-
pates in the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T).
Armenia has contributed troops to KFOR since 2004 and has
contributed troops to ISAF since 2009. Armenia is also an
IPAP participant. The most recent NATO–Armenia IPAP was
agreed in November 2011. The main spheres of cooperation
under this plan are security, defence and military issues,
public information, science, environment, democratic re-
forms, and so on. Although the troop contributions of these
states are relatively small, both continue to work through
PARP towards interoperability with NATO forces and coop-
erate with NATO in developing crisis management and civil
emergency response capabilities.
Among the countries in the South Caucasus, Georgia’s
relationship with NATO is by far the most advanced. Tbilisi
inaugurated its ﬁrst IPAP with NATO in 2004. Georgia has
contributed actively to NATO-led operations. According to
the latest ﬁgures, Georgia is the largest non-NATO
contributor to ISAF overall, currently ranking 7th out of
50 participating nations.20 In 2006 Tbilisi gained an
Intensiﬁed Dialogue on membership and at the 2008
Bucharest Summit, Georgia was promised MAP status. As
mentioned above, in terms of NATO–Georgia relations this
summit was a real turning point. Relations between Geor-
gia and NATO are the most complex among the Alliance’s
partnerships. Georgian ambitions were always the most
clearly declared within the three South Caucasian coun-
tries.21 It is necessary to note that despite re-iterating
promises towards Georgia,22 there is no real political
progress in its membership.ISAF: Key Facts and Figures, 19 Feb. 2013, http://www.nato.int/isaf/
docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, (Accessed on 20.07.2013).
21 The aspiration to become part of Transatlantic security community
and its strategic signiﬁcance is declared in the “National Security Concept
of Georgia”, see. National Security Council of Georgia, “National Security
Concept of Georgia”, http://www.nsc.gov.ge/ﬁles/ﬁles/National%
20Security%20Concept.pdf, (Accessed on 20.07.2013).
22 RIA NOVOSTI, “US Backs Georgia’s NATO, EU Ambition”, 02.05.2013,
http://en.rian.ru/world/20130502/180944966.html, (Accessed on
20.07.2013).
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the countries in Central Asia and South Caucasus, it is
obvious that NATO has aimed with all the above mentioned
mechanisms to reach interoperability. However, it is difﬁ-
cult to say that this aim was completely reached. Not all
NATO’s a partnership activities have been successful in
achieving the interoperability at which they were aimed.
The cooperation was highly concentrated on the
Afghanistan operation. Although some states have
embraced PfP more than others in the region, with the
exception of Georgia, none of them has close to the levels of
reform enacted by the Central and East European countries.
Although there are certain multilateral dimensions to
NATO’s engagement with the region, the US and NATO re-
lations with the countries in Central Asia are largely
bilateral.23
At this point, given that ISAF’s mission will end by the
end of 2014, a question arises concerning how relations
between NATO and these countries, which are practically
limited to the Afghanistan operation, will endure. In this
case, another question is how NATO’s new partnership
policy will affect the relations with these partners.26 Heidi Reisinger, “Rearranging Family Life and a Large Circle of Friends:
Reforming NATO’s Partnership Programmes”, Research Paper, NATO De-
fense College, Rome, No.72, January 2012, p.4.5. NATO’s new partnership policy
In theNewStrategic Concept, thenecessityofmaintaining
cooperation with countries and organizations beyond the
borders so as to ensure the security of NATO members was
emphasized. According to the document, NATO is to offer its
partners “more political engagementwith the Alliance, and a
substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-
led operations to which they contribute.” Indeed, the likely
reformofNATO’s partnerships policyhad beenexpected for a
while because the existing tools and frameworks were
outdated and had not corresponded to the new needs.24 In
this regard, we can say that the New Strategic Concept gave
an impetus to realize this need. Before adopting the New
Strategic Concept, Allied leaders had also decided to establish
a Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC) to be the centre
for implementation of the reform inApril 2010.25Within this
framework, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the new
partnership policy developed and agreed uponwith partners
in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting which took place in
Berlin on April 14–15 2011. In the meeting, two documents
called the “Berlin Package” were issued, with the aim of
deepening and broadening NATO’s existing partnerships.
Berlin Package also identiﬁes emerging security challenges as
a strategic objective of the Alliance’s partnership, namely
terrorism, cyber attacks, problems related energy security23 For similar approaches see Smith and Kavalski, “NATO’s Partnership”,
pp. 30–31; Rebecca Moore, “NATO’s Partners in Afghanistan”, p.100.
24 More information about the need for reform of NATO’s Partnership
Policy, see Ron Asmus, “Rethinking NATO Partnerships for the 21st Cen-
tury”. NATO Review, 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/
ART4/EN/index.htm, (Accessed on 20.06.2013); Stephan Frühling and
Benjamin Schreer, “Creating the Next Generation of NATO Partnerships”,
RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No.1, February/March 2010, pp. 52–57.
25 For more information about the PPC see, NATO, “Political and Part-
nerships Committee (PPC)”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-DB81B0BC-
339C89C0/natolive/topics_79430.htm, (Accessed on 20.07.2013).(including maritime security) and the proliferation of
weapons ofmass destruction.NATO’s newpartnershippolicy
was actualised within these two documents.
What does the new policy offer? Brieﬂy, NATO’s new
partnership policy is based on the following points. First,
NATO’s partnership policy is to become more efﬁcient and
ﬂexible. Second, the management of the partnerships is to
be thoroughly streamlined by introducing a single set of
partnership instruments. Third, the force contributions of
partners on NATO missions are to be clariﬁed and resha-
ped.26 We shall review the policy in detail. With this policy,
while preserving the institutional partnership programs
(PfP, MD, ICI), all partners are offered access to the whole
spectrum of partnership activities NATO offers. This means
that no new institutional structure was set forth that would
include the countries supporting NATO operations as global
partners.27 However, all partnership tools made available
by NATO to institutional partners have been practically
opened up to all countries that would like to cooperate
with NATO on any matter, within the scope of this new
policy. It should also be interpreted that this new policy is a
reﬂection of an intention to render more functional those
NATO partnerships established based on geographical
borders. With this new policy, the legal framework has
been established within NATO to enable the establishment
of relations with countries located in different regions of
the world to work together with NATO. In this regard, this
policy is an expression of the will of a regional defence
organization to become a global security organization.
With this new policy, NATO’s specialized programmes,
IPAP and PARP, which were previously limited to PfP
countries, is now open to all partners. All partners with
which NATO has an individual programme of cooperation
have access to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu, which
comprises some 1600 activities, ranging from training in
maritime operational planning to crisis response opera-
tions and courses on arms control, non-proliferation and
terrorism. With this single pool of activities, the different
approval procedures for the various work plans disappear.
Furthermore, the Individual Partnership and Cooperation
programme (IPCP) is regarded as only one generic part-
nership document for all partners – in particular those
which are not part of any partnership frameworks. IPCPs
are two-year programmes which are drawn up from the27 Global partners or “partners across the globe” are the term to refer
the countries which are not part of NATO’s other partnership frameworks
but contribute to allied missions, such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and New Zealand. These states have pledged troops and have
committed ﬁnancial contributions to the NATO-led operations – espe-
cially to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – even at a time
when some important NATO members were unwilling to do this. The
increasing value of these countries to NATO is also reﬂected in changing
terminology to describe them. These states had formerly been referred to
as “contact countries” however after the Riga Summit in 2006, they were
also named “partners across the globe” or often simply as “global part-
ners”. After the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Pakistan, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Mongolia were included in this classiﬁcation.
30 For more information about US policy towards Asia-Paciﬁc see,
Xiaosong Tang, “The Future Role of the United States in the Asia-Paciﬁc
Region: Dead End or Crossroads?” Australian Journal of International Af-
fairs Vol. 66, No. 5, November 2012, pp. 592–605; Frank Hoffman, “For-
ward Partnership: A Sustainable American Strategy”, Orbis, Winter 2013,
pp. 38–40.
31 A major theme in US policy towards Asia Paciﬁc was the strength-
ening of its military deployments and partnerships in the region.
Following the agreement between the US and Australia signed on
November 17 2011, Obama stated that his goal is to ensure that “the
United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping Asia Paciﬁc
and its future”. See, TheWhite House, Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament, 17 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-ofﬁce/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-
parliament, (Accessed on 20.07.2013). In a November 2011 article for
Foreign Policy, US former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the
21st century as America’s Paciﬁc century. More information, see. Hillary
Clinton, “America’s Paciﬁc Century”, Foreign Policy, November 2011, pp.
56–63.
32 In its own words: “US economic and security interests are inextri-
cably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western
Paciﬁc and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating
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each country’s speciﬁc interests and needs.
IPCPs were included in the scope of this new policy in
order to enable relations between NATO and all partners to
be improved more elastically on a case by case basis. Since
no country’s name is directly stated in the “Berlin Package”,
it is understood that these mechanisms are open to all
countries that would like to work together with NATO as its
global partner. In fact, it can be said that with such an atti-
tude, the decisionmakers of NATO are aiming to prevent the
relations to be developed with global partners from being
perceived by any country – especially China – as an implicit
or explicit threat. On NATO’s ofﬁcial website, it is stated that
mechanisms set forth in the new policy of partnership
might include China, India Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Colombia or Brazil as well.28 After the adoption of
NATO’s NewPartnership Policy, on 19March 2012, on 4 June
2012, on 20 September, on 24 September 2012 and on 21
February 2013 Individual Partnership and Cooperation
Programme accords were signed respectively with
Mongolia, New Zealand, South Korea, Iraq and Australia.
These accords focus on promoting political dialogue and
practical cooperation on a number of joint priority areas,
including response to terrorism, multinational peace sup-
port operations and science for peace and security. Other
than Iraq, all countries that signed partnership accordswith
NATOand considered as global partners eitherhave a border
with China or are Asia Paciﬁc countries. However, in this
case, more concrete statements on NATO’s ofﬁcial website
than “such relations are open to China as well” will be
needed in order to prevent China from perceiving the
possible partnership accords between NATO and these
countries as a blocking movement against themselves.
The Summit in Chicago in May 2012 was to be the ﬁrst
major event based on the new partnership policy. In
accordance with the new partnership policy, the usual ISAF
format was extended to include the Central Asian republics,
Russia and Pakistan. It was the ﬁrst time that these coun-
tries participated in an ISAF meeting since they are not
troop contributing nations. However it was recognized that
when discussing issues such as post-2014 Afghanistan, and
transit of troops and equipment from Afghanistan, these
countries would play a central role and need to be engaged
in a discussion on the future of NATO’s engagement in
Afghanistan. Most of the Central Asian governments gave
permission in 2012 for the egress of supplies and troops
from Afghanistan in line with U.S. and NATO plans to draw
down military operations in Afghanistan by late 2014.29
There are a few important points that can be made
regarding the likely implications of the new partnership
policy. First, it is obvious that NATO’s new partnership
policy has been transformed from a supply to a demand
orientation. In other words, NATO tends to see it as the
responsibility of the partner to make partnership effective.
The effects of the ﬁnancial crisis are one of the most28 NATO, “Partnerships: A Cooperative Approach to Security”, http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84336.htm, (Accessed on
20.07.2013).
29 Nichol, Central Asia, p. 66.important reasons causing this transformation. Given the
history of the partnership relations between NATO and the
countries in the Central Asia and South Caucasus, it is no
doubt that NATO had the leading role in the establishment
and development of the relations - NATO–Georgia relations
may be the exception of this determination. Reminding
ourselves that even while NATO was playing a more active
or leading role in the relations, the relations were not
meeting their original objectives, we can say NATO’s new
tendency is an indicator that the partnership relations with
the countries which try to balance security cooperation
with NATO with that of Russia (the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation) and Russia–China (the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation) will remain in the low-proﬁle.
Second, we can say that with its new partnership policy,
NATO focuses more on developing its relations with states
which are described as global partners, but who are
excluded from its institutional partnership. In fact, this is
directly related to both the change in international
conjuncture and the Asia Paciﬁc trend in US foreign policy
which occurs in compliance with this change.
The reason for the US policy towards Asia-Paciﬁc is not
only that it seeks to maintain and develop its security and
economic relationships with long-standing allies and
partners, but also to confront its most powerful rival and
competitor, China.30 International public opinion was
reminded of this point that the US’s interests have been
connected to the developments in the Asia Paciﬁc region
since the decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by
2014.31 The approach in question is exactly reﬂected in the
new US Defense Strategic Review entitled “Sustaining
United States Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Deﬁned”, issued in January 2012. This paper emphasizes
the shifting American strategic focus to the Asia Paciﬁc
region.32a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the US
military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of ne-
cessity rebalance towards the Asia Paciﬁc region.” See, US Department of
Defense (2012). Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense. Washington: US Department of Defense http://www.
whatthefolly.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Defense_Strategic_
Guidance.pdf, (Accessed on 20.07.2013).
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be highlighted. The world is becoming more Asia-centric.
With the growth of its air and naval power, China is
trying to redeﬁne the correlation of forces in Asia. At the
same time because of its ongoing ﬁscal crisis, at least in the
meaning of the unique actor, European Union is getting
weaker and addition to this situation, the shifting of US
strategic focus to Asia Paciﬁc provides a chance for a new
Russian sphere of inﬂuence to emerge in Central and
Eastern Europe.We can say that in this balancewhere there
are many unknown variables, Russia, which is a “loyal op-
position” of NATO – at least compared to China –, will pay
attention to keeping its relations at a sustainable level. In
that case, Russia’s reaction will attract more attention
compared to the past in the relations developed with
Central Asia and South Caucasia countries. In that context,
it is clear that the possibility of NATO enlargement which
includes any of these countries is low.
6. Conclusions
The tension between Russia and Georgia in August
2008, the world ﬁnancial-economic crisis, the decision to
withdraw from Afghanistan and the shifting of US strategic
focus to Asia Paciﬁc have caused the need to re-describe
NATO’s policy towards Central Asia and South Caucasus.
At the same time, NATO is already perceived by some of
these countries in a different way than the way it was in
the ﬁrst part of 2000. One of the reasons of this case is the
change of perception and role of Russia in the region.
Russia Federation’s role in the countries of the Central Asia
and South Caucasus has greatly evolved since the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union. At ﬁrst, because of the ﬁnancial
shortages and other problems, Moscow did not have the
ability to pursue an active foreign policy with those
countries. The election of Vladimir Putin in 1999 is
accepted as the “return” of Russia to its “near abroad,”
which has become increasingly notable. The tension be-
tween Russia and Georgia in August 2008 is but oneexample that illustrates Moscow’s eagerness to maintain
an active presence in the region at any cost. Russia’s will-
ingness to expand its power in the “near abroad” has
clearly held back NATO’s efforts in the region, because it
cannot compete with Moscow’s inﬂuence.33 The develop-
ment has also illustrated that the disagreements on the
policy towards the region among NATO allies. It is still not
clear to all members what NATO’s interests are in the re-
gion, especially considering the low level of engagement
on the partners’ side. In both regions, the countries are
cautious to maintain a balance between their cooperation
with the West and Russia.
Taking into account Russia’s effect on the countries in
the region, we can say that NATO will shun advances, such
as a new NATO enlargement in the region which would
disturb Russia a great deal. US policy for balancing China in
the region also requires not disturbing its relations with
Russia. Legitimate reasons to justify NATO’s and naturally
America’s presence in the region after Afghanistan are
border security and the ﬁght against terrorism. Coopera-
tion between NATO and the countries in the region will
carry on in these matters. This will make it possible for the
regional countries to reach certain standards while at the
same time NATO will be able to sustain its presence in the
region by means of partnership policy. After adopting the
new partnership policy, the developments mentioned
above, notify our determination.
To summarize, regional security in Central Asia and
South Caucasia depends on a very sensitive balance.We can
say that in such an atmosphere, NATO will pursue a policy
which is based on a gradual peace approach predicated on
advances by small steps which will not disturb Russia.Reference
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